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Protecting Public Welfare: Mens Rea Under
Section 3008(d)(2)(A) of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act
David A Gordont
Harris Goldman stands alone before a railroad tanker in the
dead of night.1 Although he lacks the legal permit to do so, he
turns a release valve, allowing thousands of gallons of hazardous
creosote sludge to spill upon the soil. In doing so, he saves his
corporation both time and money, but exposes himself to criminal
prosecution. Must the United States Attorney prove that
Goldman knew of his failure to obtain a permit, of the hazardous
character of the waste, or of the existence of the regulation? Will
Goldman go unpunished?
Determining the requisite intent necessary to violate
§ 3008(d)(2)(A) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act 2 ("SWDA") presents a question that divides federal courts and raises larger
issues of criminal law. In a variety of contexts, courts have
struggled to properly balance principles of personal culpability
against the strong deterrent measures of a strict liability regime.3 In United States v Johnson & Towers, Inc., the Third
Circuit required proof that the defendant had knowledge of all
elements of the statute to sustain a conviction.4 In contrast, in
United States v Hoflin, the Ninth Circuit held that the statute
did not require the defendant to have knowledge of permit status,5 providing a model of analysis for the majority of circuits
that have decided the question.' Finally, in United States v
t B.A. 1995, Northwestern University; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Chicago.
' The following facts provided the basis for United States v Laughlin, 10 F3d 961,
963 (2d Cir 1993).
2

Pub L No 94-580, 90 Stat 2795, 2811 (1976), codified at 42 USC § 6928(dX2XA)

(1994). Commentators commonly refer to SWDA provisions by their section in the original

act. To maintain consistency, this Comment does so in the text. All citations in the notes
will be to the codification for ease of reference. Criminal liability is available under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 USC § 6901 et seq (1994) ("RCRA"). The
SWDA comprises one of the acts included in RCRA.
3 See, for example, United States v Balint, 258 US 250 (1922).
4 741 F2d 662, 668-69 (3d Cir 1984).
880 F2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir 1989).
6

See, for example, United States v Wagner, 29 F3d 264 (7th Cir 1994); United States
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Laughlin, the Second Circuit found a middle ground, holding that
the statute required the defendant to possess knowledge of
permit status, but applying several different standards in defining elements of the offense The Supreme Court has denied
certiorari on several occasions, leaving the issue unsettled.'
This Comment argues that the courts can properly accomplish the deterrent purposes of Congress by interpreting the
SWDA to impose a lower mens rea standard for criminal violations. This approach should increase the effectiveness of environmental statutes by forcing affected parties to pay closer attention
to them.' This Comment argues that analyzing the SWDA as a
public welfare statute allows the courts to expand the power of
the criminal justice system and eliminate the mens rea for some
elements of the offense.
This Comment evaluates the problem of mens rea in two
parts. Part I places the issue of hazardous waste disposal in
three separate contexts. It examines the traditional strict liability
framework, the special problems of environmental regulation,
and the various approaches courts have taken toward the SWDA
itself. Part II examines the text of the statute, its legislative
history, analogous environmental statutes, deterrence rationales,
and the counterargument of liability proportionate to fault. This
Comment concludes that, as a public welfare statute, the SWDA
does not require knowledge of permit status to sustain a criminal
conviction.

I.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM: CONTEXT AND CONTENT

A. Strict Liability in the Criminal Law: A Historical Analysis of
the "Public Welfare" Exception
The problem of interpreting mens rea requirements in public
welfare statutes 0 extends across the criminal law. Traditionally,
public welfare statutes do not require the defendant to have

v Dean, 969 F2d 187 (6th Cir 1992); United States v Dee, 912 F2d 741 (4th Cir 1990).
10 F3d 961, 965-67 (2d Cir 1993).
' See, for example, United States v Johnson & Towers, Inc., 469 US 1208 (1985);
United States v Hoflin, 493 US 1083 (1990).
' Sce Christopher Harris, et al, CriminalLiability for Violations of Federal Hazardous Waste Law: The 'Knowledge" of Corporationsand Their Executives, 23 Wake Forest L
Rev 203, 236 (1988).
'0 A public welfare statute involves conduct that "a reasonable person should know is
subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's health
or safety." Liparota v United States, 471 US 419, 432-33 (1985).

439]

CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THE SWDA

knowledge of each element of the offense to sustain a conviction. 1 In order to place the debate over the SWDA in context,
this Comment first examines the Supreme Court's approach to
strict liability and public welfare statutes.
The Supreme Court first encountered strict liability criminal
provisions in two early drug cases. In United States v Balint, the
Court penalized pharmaceutical distributors despite their ignorance of the unlawful character of their product. 2 By creating a
strict liability regime, the Court accomplished two central purposes. First, it allowed a substantial punishment to deter harmful behavior."3 Second, and more importantly, the Court provided incentives for potential wrongdoers to discover the law. The
Court placed the burden of following regulations on the potential
wrongdoer by presuming that she knew about'them."' Although
the Court acknowledged the general rule that "scienter [is] a
necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime," 5
it did not require a mens rea for the distribution of narcotics. 6
Similarly, in United States v Dotterweich, the Supreme Court
eliminated any mens rea requirement for violation of a federal
drug law applied to a corporation and its senior officers trafficking in mislabeled drugs. 7 The Court suggested that an otherwise innocent actor warrants punishment if she violates "a familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means
of regulation." 8 In both Balint and Dotterweich, the Court sacrificed potential unfairness to defendants for the sake of protecting
public health.
The Court took a major step toward defining the "public
welfare statute" in 1952, when Morissette v United States provided a more concrete test for the application of strict liability. 9
The Court refused to affirm the defendant's conviction for the
theft of bomb casings from a government airfield, finding that
because the violation did affect the public welfare, it failed to
pass the threshold requirement for implementing a strict liability

" Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 253-55 (1952).
12 258 US 250, 254 (1922).
1s Id at 252-53 ([I]n order to stimulate proper care, [the policy of the law may] require the punishment of the negligent person though he be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells.').
Id at 252, 254.
18 Id at 251.
1

16
'7
IS
"

Balint, 258 US at 254.
320 US 277 (1943).
Id at 280-81.
342 US 246 (1952).
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scheme.' In defining the "public welfare offense," the Court offered several limiting principles. First, the "public welfare offense" is part of a class of offenses that, while not posing a direct
threat to individuals or property, create an unacceptably high
probability of injury.2 Second, the Court insisted that under the

"public welfare offense" doctrine the potential violator, by adhering to the law, could have prevented the harm caused by such
offenses "with no more care than society might reasonably expect
and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one
who assumed his responsibilities."22 Finally, the Morissette
Court suggested that the statutory penalties should neither
greatly harm the accused's reputation nor impose any terrible
penalty.'m Despite the fact that the Court overturned the
defendant's conviction, Morissette has proved useful by establishing fundamental guidelines for public welfare offenses.'
In Staples v United States, the Court refused to apply strict
liability to the National Firearms Act's regulation of firearm possession because it imposed felony-level penalties.'m In examining
the history of the public welfare statute in the context of strict
liability, the Court distinguished the instant case from United
States v Freed," in which the Court held that a similar statute
required no knowledge of the defendant's failure to register hand
grenades.27 While the Court conceded that a hand grenade was
an inherently dangerous device, it differentiated firearms, citing
their widespread lawful use across the United States.2" Because
of the popularity of firearms, the Court worried about
overinclusiveness, not wishing to impose overly harsh punishments on "'a broad range of apparently innocent conduct." 29 The
danger of punishing innocent action militated against the desire
to protect the public welfare.
2 Id at 256 ("While such offenses do not threaten the security of the state in the
manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently
constituted.").
21 Id at 255-56.
2' Id.
2' Morissette, 342 US at 256.
' Indeed, most strict liability cases since 1952 cite Morissette as relevant authority.
See, for example, Liparota v United States, 471 US 419, 425-26 (1985); Staples v United
States, 511 US 600, 606-07 (1994).
25 511 US 600, 619-20 (1994).
" 401 US 601 (1971).
27 Staples, 511 US at 608-12.
28 Id at 610-12.
" Id at 610, quoting Liparota, 471 US at 426.
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Staples raised important questions regarding the definition
of the "public welfare offense." Although the Court hesitated to
apply strict liability broadly, Staples suggests that it remains
willing to do so subject to two exceptions: It would not apply
strict liability to any felony or to seemingly innocent behavior. 0
With those exceptions, however, the Court seems to remain committed to following its Balint-Dotterweich line of analysis."'
B. Focusing the Problem: Placing Strict Liability in the
Environmental Context
Special problems of environmental protection demand a fresh
look at the debate over public welfare offenses. An examination
of two important decisions, United States v InternationalMiner3 illusals & Chemical Corp.32 and United States v Weitzenhoff,"
trates the need for a lesser standard of mens rea in the environmental context.
In United States v InternationalMinerals & Chemical Corp.,
the Supreme Court created a framework to evaluate the viability
of a strict liability regime within the environmental context.'
The Court, addressing a violation of a corrosive liquid transportation statute,35 held that a "knowing" violation of the statute required only knowledge of the action, not of its illegality." It advanced the familiar rationale that, in the case of public welfare
statutes, "the probability of regulation is so great that anyone
who is aware that he is in possession of [corrosive liquids] or
dealing
with them must be presumed to be aware of the regula37
tion."

The Court distinguished the standard it established from
strict liability." The Court explained that it merely refused to
apply the knowledge requirement to awareness of the regulation.
39
A conviction still required knowledge of the activity itself.

Most importantly, the Court suggested that environmental
hazards, like dangerous narcotics and hand grenades, may in-

30 Id at 619-20.
31
'2
'3

Staples, 511 US at 618-19.
402 US 558 (1971).
35 F3d 1275 (9th Cir 1993).
402 US 558.

' 18 USC § 834(a), repealed by Pub L No 96-129, 93 Stat 1015 (1979).
InternationalMinerals, 402 US at 560, 562.
" Id at 565.
38 Id at 560.
'9 Id.
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volve the public welfare.' The Court required no knowledge of
the statute's existence where "dangerous or deleterious devices or
products or obnoxious waste materials are involved."4 ' This
analysis supported more stringent penalties for environmental
violations and lower standards of culpability for environmental
perpetrators.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v Weitzenhoft 2
heralded a dramatic expansion of the "entire spectrum of environmental criminal statutes."" It applied the rationale of International Minerals to hold that the knowledge requirement of the
Clean Water Act" referred only to the criminal action, not to
the regulation itself."' In doing so, the court relied on three rationales. First, it found that Congress intended to enact increased
penalties to accomplish its deterrence goals." Second, it categorized the Clean Water Act as a public welfare statute, comparing
it to the statutory construction used in InternationalMinerals.4 7
Finally, and most significantly, the Ninth Circuit distinguished
from Weitzenhoff two intervening Supreme Court decisions which
had called the application of strict liability into question,"
United States v Ratzlaf' and Staples v United States.0 The
court distinguished Ratzlaf because the statute in that case did
not affect the public welfare.5 In distinguishing Staples, it suggested that while both guns and environmental discharges pose
dangers to society, sewage dumping involves deleterious products
and obnoxious waste materials. This fact puts the "discharger on
notice that his acts may pose a public danger."5 2 By distinguish-

, International Minerals, 402 US at 565, citing United States v Balint, 258 US 250
(1922), and United States v Freed, 401 US 601 (1971).
41 Id.
42 35 F3d 1275 (9th Cir 1993).
' David S. Krakoff and Fred R. Wagner, Advising Clients in the Post-Weitzenhoff

Era: The Courts Expand Scope of Environmental Crimes, 1995 Crim Just 11, 11 (Fall).
" The Clean Water Act holds liable anyone who "knowingly violates... any permit
condition or limitation implementing any of [eight] sections in a permit issued under section 1342." 33 USC § 1319(c)(2) (1994).

35 F3d at 1286.
Id at 1283.
7 Id at 1284.
Id at 1285.
'9 511 US 135 (1994).

5 511 US 600 (1994).
51 35 F3d at 1285.'Rather, the Court in Ratzlaf examined a "willful" attempt to structure a cash transaction "for the purpose of evading a financial institution's reporting
requirement." 511 US at 139, citing Pub L No 99-570, 100 Stat 3207 et seq (1986), codified at 31 USC § 5324 (1994).
52

35 F3d at 1286. Excessive discharges of sewage deserve this higher standard
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ing the Court's holding in Staples, the Ninth Circuit effectively
reaffirmed the place of environmental protection in public welfare
law. Consequently, it also solidified the arguments for strict
liability readings of similar environmental statutes. 3
Within this framework, the SWDA provides a battleground
for principles of deterrence and culpability. On one side, the
recent Supreme Court cases suggest that strict liability may not
apply to the Act." On the other, deterrence, congressional intent, and the threat of public harm may make environmental
jurisprudence an exception to that trend.
C. Three Interpretations of Section 3008(d)(2)(A)
The criminal provision of the SWDA requires the defendant's
awareness of certain elements of the offense, but the Act does not
clearly identify the extent of that requirement. It imposes criminal penalties on any person who:
(2) knowingly treats, stores or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter(A) without a permit under this subchapter.., or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition
or requirement of such permit.55
Courts have taken three approaches to the question of whether
and for what elements this statutory language allows for strict
liability or, alternatively, imposes a knowledge requirement.
In United States v Johnson & Towers, Inc., the Third Circuit
interpreted the SWDA to require knowledge of all three major
elements of the offense to sustain a conviction, despite recognizing the jurisprudential tradition of allowing diminished mens rea
for public welfare statutes." In doing so, it held that the offense
required knowledge of the action, of the waste's hazardous character, and of the status of the permit.57 Though citing liberally
to United States v Dotterweich, s as well as agreeing that Congress enacted RCRA to accomplish purposes similar to those

because they can cause "cholera, hepatitis, and other serious illnesses, and can have
serious repercussions for public health and welfare." Id.

' See Krakoff and Wagner, 1995 Crim Just at 14 (cited in note 43). But see United
States v Ahmad, 101 F3d 386 (5th Cir 1996).
See text accompanying notes 25-31.
42 USC § 6928(dX2).
741 F2d 662, 668 (3d Cir 1984).
51 Id at 670.
320 US 277 (1943). See text accompanying notes 17-18.
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envisioned by other public welfare statutes, the court insisted on
the necessity of a comprehensive mens rea requirement to sustain a conviction. s
The court based its holdings on both congressional intent and
statutory syntax. First, it found that Congress must have intended the word "knowingly" in Section 3008(d)(2) to apply to both (A)
and (B), even though only (B) contains an additional "knowing
violation" clause. The court reasoned that the two subsections
should impose similar standards of intent for similar offenses,
finding it unlikely that "Congress could have intended to subject
to criminal prosecution those persons who acted when no permit
had been obtained irrespective of their knowledge ... but not
those persons who acted in violation of the terms of a permit
unless that action was knowing."6 Second, it followed the
Eighth Circuit's reading of a similar section of RCRA that asserted that the term "knowingly" modified all elements of the offense,
"purely as a verbal matter."
In United States v Hoflin, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected Johnson & Towers, holding that some portions of the statute
required no mens rea."2 In Hoflin, the defendant did not know
that his employer lacked a permit for disposing of hazardous
paint and sludge.' Still, the court found that Congress passed
RCRA in order to "protect the national health and environment.6' Therefore, as a public welfare statute, the court reasoned, RCRA did not mandate that the offender had to know that
the government forbade her activities, only that the government
regulated them. 5 Unlike Johnson & Towers, Hoflin emphasized
the effect of toxic dumping on the public welfare. Indeed, the
court reiterated the principle that Congress regulates hazardous
activities so often that courts could presume that defendants
must know of a statute's existence." Finding irrelevant the
defendant's ignorance as to the lack of a permit, Hoflin held that

"
6
61
62

'

741 F2d at 666.
Id at 668.
Id at 668, quoting United States v Marvin, 687 F2d 1221, 1226 (8th Cir 1982).
880 F2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir 1989).
Id at 1035-36.

In doing so, the court relied on its decision in Wyckoff v EPA, 796 F2d 1197 (9th
Cir 1986), to assert that RCRA was a public welfare statute. Hoflin, 880 F2d at 1038.
65

880 F2d at 1038.

Id, citing United States v InternationalMinerals & Chemical Corp., 402 US 558,
565 (1971).
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the defendant need only know that the waste "had the potential
to be harmful." 7
Several circuits have followed the Ninth Circuit's ruling in
Hoflin. In United States v Dee, the Fourth Circuit emphasized
the presumption that anyone handling potentially hazardous
materials should know their permit status." Similarly, in
United States v Dean, the Sixth Circuit adopted Hoflin's finding
that the SWDA was a public welfare statute, making it one of the
"more likely candidates for diminished mens rea requirements." 9' In each case, the courts read the knowledge requirement narrowly with respect to the permit section of the statute.
Dean claimed that in doing so, however, the court did not impose
a strict liability standard, because individuals working with hazardous waste have "every reason to be aware that their activities
are regulated by law."70 In a sparse opinion, the Seventh Circuit
also followed the Hoflin line of analysis in United States v Wagner. 71 Similarly, in United States v Baytank, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that the term "knowingly" did not require knowledge of
permit status under the SWDA.72
The Second Circuit attempted to find middle ground. In
United States v Laughlin, the court sustained the conviction of a
corporate officer who had personally dumped hazardous waste in
the middle of the night.7' As in Hoflin, the Laughlin court held
that criminal liability did not depend on knowledge of permit status, but rather only upon knowledge of the act of disposal. 74 However, the Laughlin court did suggest that the mens rea for the
character of the waste should be higher. 75 By doing so, Laughlin
may have undermined the deterrent effect of the SWDA. The
'

Id at 1039.

71

912 F2d 741, 745 (4th Cir 1990).
969 F2d 187, 192 (6th Cir 1992).
Id.
29 F3d 264 (7th Cir 1994).

72

934 F2d 599, 612 (5th Cir 1991).

70

7' Laughlin, 10 F3d 961 (2d Cir 1993). For an in-depth factual analysis of Laughlin

and the events surrounding the case, see Bruce R. Bryan, The Battle Between Mens Rea
and the Public Welfare: United States v. Laughlin Finds a Middle Ground, 6 Fordham
Envir L J 157 (1995), in which the appellant's lawyer describes the appellant's arguments
in the limited context of this central case.
7 10 F3d at 966.
71 Laughlin held that a jury instruction defining hazardous waste as any solid waste
that might pose a "potential hazard to human health or the environment," in place of the
statutory requirement of a "substantial present hazard" did not constitute plain error. Id
at 967. In contrast to Hoflin, however, the Laughlin court suggested that the jury "should
have the benefit of the statutory definition," in order to properly identify "not simply a
potential hazard, but a substantial potential hazard." Id.
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court left unanswered whether the defendant need truly recognize the hazardous character of the waste.76 This uncertainty
may lessen the frequency of convictions under the regulation,
making potential offenders less concerned with the consequences
of their actions. Still, the Laughlin court cited Balint77 and International Minerals 78 to indicate its serious regard for public welfare statutes. By raising the knowledge requirement for the hazardousness of the waste, while eliminating it for permit status,
Laughlin applied a pragmatic view to the dispute, attempting to
balance principles of culpability with the value of protecting
public welfare. 7 Whether the court's view struck the proper balance remains open for debate.
II. ADDRESSING THE ISSUE: WHY THE SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL

ACT PERMIT PROVISION DEMANDS A STRICT LIABILITY READING
The Second Circuit's careful shift in United States v
Laughlin' leaves open the possibility of unsettling the Ninth
Circuit's often-followed interpretation of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act.81 In analyzing this issue, this Comment discusses several
approaches to the problem. First, it applies a textual analysis,
hoping to bring focus to ambiguous portions of the statute. Second, it examines the legislative history of the statute in order to
determine what Congress intended. Third, it compares the Solid
Waste Disposal Act to other environmental statutes, focusing on
the effect of the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in United States v
Weitzenhoff.82 Fourth, it places environmental criminality into
the larger scheme of public welfare jurisprudence established by
the litany of cases leading up to Staples v United States.8 Finally, it addresses the culpability concerns that remain the most
difficult counterargument for proponents of strict liability to
overcome.

" Bryan, 6 Fordham Envir L J at 194 (cited in note 73).
258 US 250 (1922). See text accompanying notes 12-16.
7' 402 US 558 (1971). See text accompanying notes 34-41.
"' Bryan, 6 Fordham Envir L J at 196 (cited in note 73).
80 10 F3d 961 (2d Cir 1993).
a' United States v Hoflin, 880 F2d 1033 (9th Cir 1989) (interpreting 42 USC
§ 6928(dX2) (1994)).
35 F3d 1275 (9th Cir 1993).
511 US 600 (1994).
77
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A. The Textual Argument
When interpreting any statute, the text itself provides an
excellent starting point. The dispute here revolves around the
language in § 3008(d)(2) of the SWDA. 4 Specifically , it focuses
on the word "knowingly," and how much of the section this adverb modifies. As a matter of syntax, "knowingly" should at least
modify the phrase immediately following it: "treats, stores or
disposes.' After that clause, the statute presents two interesting ambiguities: whether the knowledge standard affects either
the hazardousness or permit requirements.
No court has yet taken the position that "knowingly" does
not modify "hazardous waste," imposing true strict liability upon
dumpers who did not know the character of their waste. Indeed,
in United States v Johnson & Towers, Inc., the government unsuccessfully attempted to convince the court of this "overly literal" approach."' Even in United States v Hoflin, the court refused
to exempt the hazardous character of the waste from a knowledge standard. 7
As a textual matter, however, this portion of the statute
remains ambiguous. The Laughlin court's determination that the
"better course" demands the defendant know that the waste poses a "substantial" hazard suggests that this issue remains open
to interpretation.' A careful reading of the statute might allow
a court to find a person liable for knowingly disposing of material
that she did not know was hazardous. Although no court has yet
adopted this position, the public welfare rationale for strict liability may compel its future use should current deterrent measures
fail.
Subsection (2)(A) of the provision presents an entirely different situation. While subsection (2)(B) requires a "knowing violation," subsection (2)(A) merely requires not "having obtained a
permit." 9 It makes no mention of knowledge. In fact, by mentioning knowledge in the beginning of § 3008(d)(2) and again in
subsection (2)(B), its omission in subsection (2)(A) draws greater
notice. If anything, the plain language leads to a presumption

42 USC § 6928(dX2) (1994). See text accompanying note 55.

The sentence structure of § 3008(dX2) suggests this reading. United States v
Marvin, 687 F2d 1221, 1226 (8th Cir 1982).

741 F2d 662, 667-68 (3d Cir 1984).
8 880 F2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir 1989).
10 F3d at 967.
'9 42 USC § 6928(dX2).
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that one need not have knowledge of permit status to violate the
statute. Still, the term "knowingly" at the top of subsection (2) at
least provides an argument for ambiguity, forcing a more probing
analysis.
As a final textual note, § 3008(d)(1) provides an interesting
comparison. It provides for the conviction of any person who
"knowingly transports... any hazardous waste... to a facility
which does not have a permit.' ° In United States v Hayes International Corp., the Eleventh Circuit discussed the question of
"how far down the sentence 'knowingly' travels."9 2 The court
held that in order to convict under § 3008(d)(1), the defendant
must have knowledge of its lack of permit.9 3 Although it provides analogous text, the fact that no structural division exists,
as with subsections (2)(A) and (2)(B), suggests that the textual
analysis may lead to different conclusions. As such, it does not
resolve the ambiguity of § 3008(d)(2). Because Congress has
failed to clarify the language of the statute, the burden of interpretation falls on the courts. If courts find the text ambiguous,
they must examine legislative history and policy rationales to
determine the proper scope of the knowledge requirement.
B. Congressional Intent
The Solid Waste Disposal Act's legislative history, both in its
1976 passage" and its 1980 amendment,9 5 fails to provide a
clear resolution to the textual ambiguity. Indeed, Congress did
not seek "to define 'kmowing' for offenses under subsection (d);
that process [was] left to the courts under general principles.""
Further, Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 within the context of "sufficiently narrow" criminal penalties,97 because, at the time, the

9'
'1

42 USC § 6928(dX1).
786 F2d 1499 (11th Cir 1986).
Id at 1503 (discussing the contrary approaches of Liparota v United States, 471 US

419 (1985), and United States v Yermian, 468 US 63 (1984), to the scope of knowledge requirements).
9 786 F2d at 1504.
Pub L No 94-580, 90 Stat 2795 et seq (1976), codified at 42 USC § 6901 et seq
(1994).
95

Pub L No 96-482, 94 Stat 2334, 2340 (1980), codified as amended at 42 USC § 6928

(1994).

" Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, HR Rep No 96-1444, 96th Cong, 2d
Sess 39 (1980), reprinted in 1980 USCCAN 5038.
'7 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, HR Rep No 94-1491, 94th Cong,
2d Sess 31 (1976), reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 6269.
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SWDA contained misdemeanor, not felony provisions." Congress
did not implement a felony liability scheme until 1980,"9 significantly upgrading the penalty level and thereby changing the
relevant analysis.
RCRA's legislative history supports the contention that environmental crimes affect the public welfare. By enacting a cradleto-grave statute designed to include all environmental regulation,
Congress intended for RCRA to serve as the primary environmental caretaker of public welfare.0 ° Indeed, Congress passed
RCRA in order to "protect the national health and environment."' O' In every instance, Congress has noted the increasing
importance of this inherently public problem.
Congress emphasized the deterrent effect of environmental
laws. Upon passing the bill in 1976, the House acknowledged the
seriousness of "disposal of hazardous wastes without a permit."0 2 The report indicated that, by solving the hazardous
waste problem, RCRA would accomplish its purpose of eliminating "the last remaining loophole in environmental law.""°3 Upon.
upgrading to felony-level penalties for violations of the act in
1980, Congress stated that it "intended to prevent abuses of the
permit system by those who obtain and then knowingly disregard
them." °4 Congress sought to exempt those who commit "minor
or technical" violations of the permit scheme, but nonetheless
indicated a desire to deter the more calculating offenders.0 5
C. Analogous Environmental Statutes: Operating in a PostWeitzenhoff World
Examining another environmental statute, the Ninth Circuit,
in United States v Weitzenhoff, agreed that legislative history,
indicating strong support for environmental protection suggested.
a public welfare approach to statutory interpretation."° The
court held that the Clean Water Act's "knowingly violate" provi-

Id.
Pub L No 96-482, 94 Stat 2334, 2340 (1980), codified as amended at 42 USC § 6928
(1994).

100 Wyckoffv EPA, 796 F2d 1197 (9th 1986).

'01 42 USC § 6901 (1994).
'02

HR Rep No 94-1491 at 30, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 6268 (cited in note 97).

103

Id.

'04 HR Rep No 96-1444 at 37, reprinted in 1980 USCCAN 5036 (cited in note 96).
105 Id.
'06 35 F3d 1275 (9th Cir 1993).
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sion 0 7 did not make awareness of the regulation an element of
the crime."° Despite the fact that Weitzenhoff examines a mistake of law, the similarity of both the language and the subject
matter suggests that Weitzenhoff may present a situation analogous to disputes under the Solid Waste Disposal Act. The importance of the environment has led many to believe that the need
for strong deterrent measures supersedes principles of culpability. 1 9 By examining the far-reaching implications of Weitzenhoff
for the interpretation of the SWDA, courts can better balance
these principles.
Weitzenhoff may effect radical changes in environmental
regulatory schemes.'10 Because of its recognition of the increasing importance of environmental protection, enforcement of
RCRA may now criminalize previously "lawful, permitted activity.""' This change would directly affect analysis of the SWDA.
Indeed, the dissent in Weitzenhoff warned of its implications,
arguing that "[d]ilution of the traditional requirement of a criminal state of mind, and application of the criminal law to innocent
conduct, reduces the moral authority of our system of criminal
law.""' This argument did not overcome the deterrence analysis
in the majority opinion, because the majority emphasized protecting the public from the hazards of pollution."'
Weitzenhoff itself acknowledged its similarity to the Hoflin
line of analysis. Discussing Hoflin,"4 International Minerals,"' and Dotterweich,"6 the court reaffirmed the strength of
the public welfare rationale." 7 Most importantly, Weitzenhoff
distinguished itself from United States v Liparota" and Staples v United States". by holding that the "dire consequences"

33 USC § 1319(cX2) (1994).

Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d at 1284.
See, for example, Comment, Environmental Law-Getting Strict with Hazardous
Waste Permits: The Better View of United States v. Hoflin, 15 J Corp L 623 (1990); Jane F.
Barrett and Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowledge Requirement of Section
6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59 Geo Wash L Rev 862 (1991).
110 David S. Krakoff and Fred R. Wagner, Advising Clients in the Post-Weitzenhoff
Era, 1995 Crim Just 11 (Fall).
108
"o

.
12
"
114
115

Id at 14.

35 F3d at 1293 (Kleinfeld, dissenting from order rejecting rehearing en banc).
Id at 1286.

880 F2d 1033 (9th Cir 1989).
402 US 558 (1971).

116 320 US 277 (1943).

Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d at 1284.
471 US 419 (1985) (involving illegal sale of food stamps).
1 511 US 600 (1994) (involving illegal possession of a firearm).
"'

18

439]

-

CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THE SWDA

of environmental contamination require a higher standard of
protection. 2
Given that the Second Circuit in United States v Laughlin
recently sought to constrain the strict liability analysis of the
SWDA,... the Weitzenhoff decision takes on added importance.
Although Laughlin agreed with Hoflin in refusing to require
knowledge of the permit requirement,"2 it suggested a higher
standard of knowledge with regard to the hazardous character of
the waste." Weitzenhoff argued that pollution represents the
"type of activity that puts the discharger on notice that his acts
may pose a public danger,""24 so perhaps lessening the knowledge requirement for the "hazardous waste" clause makes
sense." If nothing else, such an interpretation might encourage potential violators to carefully examine their disposal systems. This result achieves the purposes established by the Supreme Court in InternationalMinerals, where it noted that laws
regulating environmentally dangerous substances warranted.
more generous interpretations." Since that time, congressional
silence has aggravated problems of ambiguity. The rule of lenity
gives Congress the responsibility to clarify its deterrent purposes."2 Absent new legislation, however, the courts must attempt
to effectuate the statute's purposes without ignoring its language.
D. Public Welfare and the Deterrence Rationale: Applying Strict
Liability After Staples
1. Public Welfare.
Deterrence of environmentally harmful activity provides the
best argument in favor of a strict liability regime. By their very'
nature, strict liability statutes eliminate the knowledge requirement in order to force potentially criminal actors not only to heed
the law, but to seek it out." While strict liability may punish
without regard to individual culpability, limiting principles can
'2' 35 F3d at 1286.
121
'2

10 F3d 961 (2d Cir 1993).
Id at 966.

123 Id at 967.

12 35 F3d at 1286.

" Should the application of strict liability to the permit provision prove ineffective,
the hazardous character of the waste is the element for which lessening the mens rea will
most likely improve deterrence.
'2 402 US at 564-65.
" See Comment, The Rule of Lenity and Environmental Crime, 1997 U Chi Legal F
607.
128

Dotterweich, 320 US at 285; United States v Balint, 285 US 250, 252-54 (1922).
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ameliorate concerns of proportionality while retaining the deterrent purpose of Congress.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Staples v United States"2
provides two examples of placing limits on strict liability. First,
although Staples refused to apply strict liability to the possession
of illegal firearms, it acknowledged the importance of regulatory
measures. 1" Indeed, the Court itself stated that although it did
not advocate strict liability, it required only that "a defendant
know[] that he is dealing with a dangerous device ... .1 3 1 This
reasoning would not mandate the imposition of a knowledge
requirement on permit status.
Second, the Staples Court focused on the magnitude of the
penalty, refusing, absent clear Congressional instruction, to apply
felony punishment to a crime with no mens rea. 2 Even so,
courts may impose some balancing scheme to retain strict liability regimes, if at lesser penalty thresholds." At the very least,
the substantial monetary penalties imposed by the SWDA survive the Staples ruling.
The public welfare rationale provides additional support for
lessening the mens rea requirement under the SWDA. In both
United States v Balint" and United States v Dotterweich,"'
the Supreme Court held public welfare offenders to a lesser standard of intent. In International Minerals, the Court suggested
that environmental statutes regulating dangerous materials
warrant public welfare treatment.'6 Because the SWDA presents a situation analogous to InternationalMinerals, courts interpreting the statute should follow the Supreme Court in applying
the public welfare offense doctrine.1 37 Therefore, courts should
not require knowledge of the permit as a criterion for conviction.'
'
13
131

511 US 600.
Id at 619.
Id at 607.

Id at 616-19.
" For a look at the possible effect of Staples on the criminal provisions of RCRA, see
Comment, Are Obnoxious Wastes More Like Machineguns or Hand Grenades?: Mens Rea
Under the Resource Conservationand Recovery Act After Staples v. United States, 43 Kan
L Rev 1117 (1995).
13 258 US 250 (1922).
1 320 US 277.
13 402 US at 564-65.
137 InternationalMinerals interpreted the phrase "knowingly violates any such regulation" under 18 USC § 834(a) (1976), repealed by Pub L No 96-129, 93 Stat 1015 (1979),
while the SWDA contains the phrase "knowingly treats, stores or disposes." 42 USC
§ 6928(dX2). See text accompanying note 55.
138 For a discussion of strict liability and public welfare, see Note, The CriminalProvi'2
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2. Deterrence.
Imposing higher penalties to accompany lower standards of
knowledge may enhance the deterrent effect of the SWDA. If held
to a presumption of knowledge, environmental actors should
conform to legal standards with greater frequency by investigating their responsibilities. This interpretive scheme may lead to a
slight chilling effect, creating incentives for actors to reduce the
incidence of dumping or even the generation of hazardous
waste.'39 Still, those individuals who stay in business should
not have to compete with those who wish to gain an unfair advantage by increasing production in jurisdictions that are less
strict against "accidental" dumpings. If courts apply the Solid
Waste Disposal Act in a uniform manner, compliance should not
unfairly burden companies.
E. The Culpability Objection: The Case Against Strict Liability
Although congressional intent and public policy support
reading strict liability into the Solid Waste Disposal Act, the
culpability objection remains a significant counterargument.
Quite simply, the principle of culpability suggests that the law
should hold no one disproportionately liable to their level of
fault." Indeed, some commentators suggest that the Third Circuit 141 properly interpreted the SWDA to require knowledge of
the action, the character of the waste, and the permit status. 42
While acknowledging the importance of environmental protection,
they suggest that the variety of enforcement mechanisms alleviate the need to lessen mens rea.'"
This conclusion, however, downplays the need for effective
deterrent measures in the environmental context.'" Courts can
sions of RCRA&Should Strict Liability Be Applied to Its Permit Requirement?, 5 St John's
J Legal Comment 127 (1989).
139 The "chilling effect," sometimes called "overdeterrence," is present when actors de-

cide not to engage in lawful activity because the legislature has failed to clearly draw the
line between legal and illegal activity. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the
Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U Chi L Rev 263, 280 (1982); Isaac Ehrlich

and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J Legal Stud 257,
263 (1974).
"4o"The requirement that punishment be proportional to the seriousness of the offense

has traditionally been a salient principle of punishment." Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen
J. Schulhofer, CriminalLaw and Its Processes 282 (Little, Brown 6th ed 1995).
141 Johnson & Towers, 741 F2d 662.

See, for example, Michael Vitiello, Does Culpability Matter?: Statutory Construction
Under 42 USC § 6928, 6 Tulane Envir L J 187, 256 (1993).
142

143

Id at 256-57, citing 42 USC § 6928(d), (g), (h) (1992).

14

Vitiello notes a general disillusionment with strict liability, but fails to truly ad-
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distinguish environmental criminality from other types of offenses in several ways. First, and most important, because of their
sophistication, those actors most likely to commit offenses
against the environment have presumptive knowledge of their
permit status.'" Second, environmental crime does not carry
the same stigma as more personal crimes of violence.'" Finally,
economic penalties imposed by the courts may actually succeed in
effective deterrence, because of the explicit cost-benefit choices at
stake in environmental risk scenarios.
Although commentators can legitimately argue the respective
values of deterrence and culpability, all agree that the circuit
split has caused offenders to receive "unequal treatment under
the law" for Solid Waste Disposal Act violations. 14 7 Now that
Staples and Weitzenhoff have created added confusion over the
proper use of strict liability in environmental law, the Supreme
Court should provide guidance for the interpretation of this and
other environmental regulations.
CONCLUSION

The problem of hazardous waste disposal, like other environmental concerns, seems certain to occupy a place of public importance in the coming years. In order to create an effective scheme
of environmental protection, the law must deter. Punishment
must occur often enough, and with enough force, to change the
behavior of individuals and corporations. One may worry that
innocent actors will face unjust prison sentences and outrageous
fines. In reality, a strong set of environmental laws puts all those
involved in waste disposal on fair notice to follow the
government's restrictions upon them. Further, a stricter regime
would cause actors to err on the side of environmental integrity if
any uncertainty remains.
In order to provide strong environmental protection, courts
should read the Solid Waste Disposal Act to not require knowledge of permit status. Further, although knowledge of the character of disposed waste protects the innocent actors, the courts
should consider the mens rea as to that element carefully. If low-

dress the deterrence argument. Id at 245.
'
InternationalMinerals, 402 US at 565.
','
The reputational harm of incarceration for personal offenses creates a compelling
argument for mens rea. Society's interest in the environment places more primacy on
values of deterrence than it does on punishment.
', Vitiello, 6 Tulane Envir L J at 255 (cited in note 142).
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ering the bar of knowledge to include permit status does not
create the desired deterrent effect, lowering the bar on the "hazardous waste" clause presents the next best option.
Most circuits have followed the correct line of analysis to find
a strict liability regime with regard to knowledge of the regulation and permit status. Still, until the Supreme Court explicitly
adopts this position, it will not send the message that environmental concerns retain a place of primacy. The Court should
affirm a stricter reading of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, so parties will take the deterrent purposes of the statute more seriously
and the Act can accomplish its preventive goals.

